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Review Essay : the Impact of 
Congressional Redistricting 
in the 1990s on Minority Re.pre-
sentation, Party Competition, 
and Legislative Responsiveness 
Seth C. McKee 
University of Texas at Austin 
This essay reviews recent research evaluating the effect 
of 1990s congressional redistricting on minority repre-
sentation, party competition , and legislative responsive-
ness. Each of these three lines of research is initially 
discussed · separately, with an emphasis on piecing to-
gether consistent findings and offering possible explana-
tions for conflicting results . Then, several of the disputed 
issues that stem from these areas of research are briefly 
discussed . The essay concludes with some final observa-
tions. 
The racial/ethnic and partisan composition of the House of Representatives underwent drastic change in the 1990s. The number of Black and Hispanic representatives in-
creased dramatically in 1992. In the 1994 elections the GOP net-
ted 52 seats, enough to take back the House for the first time in 
forty years. Furthermore, party polarization in the Congress in-
creased throughout the 1990s as Democrats became more unified 
and liberal and Republicans more unified and conservative in 
their roll-call voting behavior (Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 
2003). 
Is it possible that these three political occurrences are related 
and that they were all influenced by a common factor? Perhaps, 
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and since the 1992 elections, social scientists have been hard at 
work determining the extent to which redistricting in the 1990s 
played a role in affecting the aforementioned developments. In 
this review essay I discuss the findings of researchers who have 
sought to assess the effect of congressional redistricting on mi-
nority representation, party competition, and legislative respon-
siveness. 
This essay is constrained in several ways. First, my review is 
limited to published research and therefore it takes stock of what 
has been made available to the widest possible audience. Second, 
because the focus is on congressional redistricting in the 1990s, 
the research I comment on has been confined to congressional 
studies that necessarily include an analysis of the impact of re-
districting in at least one election from 1992 through 2000. 
Third, although this review is not exhaustive, it is broad enough 
to be considered representative of published research in the areas 
I cover. Finally, the lion's share of research on 1990s redistrict-
ing is empirical and most of the studies I review rely on hard 
data to conduct statistical analyses that gauge the impact of re-
districting. 
The review proceeds as follows. I consider in sequence the 
effect of redistricting on minority representation, party competi-
tion, and legislative responsiveness. Next, I discuss several of the 
unresolved debates over the impact of redistricting; the discus-
sion shows the interdependence of the three lines of research. 
Last, I conclude with some parting thoughts. 
MINORITY REPRESENTATION 
In this section I document the increase in the number of Afri-
can-American and Hispanic representatives as a consequence of 
racial redistricting. Then, I discuss descriptive and substantive 
representation and review several studies that seek to quantify 
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the percentage of a district's minority population needed to ob-
tain descriptive representation. 
The 1990s round of congressional redistricting was unprece-
dented in terms of the emphasis that was placed on increasing 
the number of minority representatives. Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) as amended in 1982 stipulated that electoral 
arrangements that had the effect of diluting the votes of minority 
groups would not be permitted. Given the timing (after the 1980s 
reapportionment was completed) of this new provision , its con-
sequences were not fully realized until the 1990s when the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) used Section 2 along with the 
preclearance provision of Section 5 to pressure the states under 
the VRA to maximize their number of majority-minority districts 
(Bullock 1995a; 1995b; 2000; Clayton 2000; Cunningham 
2001). 
It is indisputable that racial redistricting served to dramati-
cally increase the number of Black and Hispanics elected to Con-
gress. Table 1 shows data on black representatives and black 
majority districts and data on Hispanic representatives and His-
panic majority districts. After the creation of 15 new black ma-
jority districts in 1992, the number of black representatives 
increased by 52% (25 in 1990 to 38 in 1992). All but two of the 
new districts were in the South. 1 Most black members hail from 
black majority districts and only one black majority district has 
been represented by someone who was not Black. 2 Court-ordered 
redistricting reduced the number of black majority districts in the 
South and yet every Black incumbent whose district was conse-
quently made majority white won reelection-this fact has led to 
a vigorous dispute over the necessity of black majority districts 
for the purpose of electing Black Americans. 
1 Unless stated otherwise, throughout this study the South refers to the states of the Con-
federacy : Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi , North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
2 District I in Pennsylvania from 1992 to present has been represented by a white Democ-
rat. 
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TABLEl 
REDISTRICTING AND 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND H!SP ANIC REPRESENTATION 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN 
Black Representatives 
South 5 17 17 16 16 16 
Non-South 20 21 22 21 23 21 
Total 25 38 39 37 39 37 
Black Majority Districts (BMDs) 
South 4 17 17 11 10 10 
Non-South 13 15 15 15 15 15 
Total 17 32 32 26 25 25 
BMDs/Black Representatives 
Ratio 17/25 32/38 32/39 26/37 25/39 25/37 
.68 .84 .82 .70 .64 .67 
HISPANIC 
Hispanic Representatives 
South 5 7 7 8 8 8 
Non-South 5 10 11 10 11 11 
Total 10 17 18 18 19 19 
Hispanic Majority Districts (HMDs) 
South 6 9 9 8 8 9 
Non-South 5 10 10 11 10 15 
Total 11 19 19 19 18 24 
HMDs/Hispanic Representatives 
Ratio 11/10 19/ 17 19/18 19/18 18/19 24/19 1.10 1.11 1.05 1.05 .94 1.26 
SOURCE: Data compiled by the author from The Almanac of American 
Politics: 1992-2002; Vital Statistics on American Politics: 1999-2000; 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies website (for total number 
of black representatives in 2000). 
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The creation of Hispanic majority districts in 1992 has also 
served to increase the number of Hispanic representatives al-
though some of these districts have non-Hispanic representatives 
(see the ratios in Table I). Compared to Blacks, a larger percent-
age Hispanic population is needed to elect a Hispanic because of 
the high rate of non-citizens, less cohesive voting (not as De-
mocratic), and sizable portions of Hispanics below voting age in 
these districts (Handley, Grofman, and Arden 1998; Lublin 
1997a; 1997b ). 
From the data in Table 1 it is clear that Black and Hispanic 
descriptive representation increased in the 1990s. In this context, 
descriptive representation means that a particular racial/ethnic 
group elects one of the "members of their group to public office" 
(Lublin 1997b, 12). Substantive representation on the other hand, 
means that a representative, regardless of race/ethnicity, furthers 
the policy interests of a particular racial/ethnic group. The dis-
tinction between these two kinds of representation is important 
because several studies have found evidence of a tradeoff be-
tween maximizing descriptive and substantive minority represen-
tation. Simply stated, the tradeoff stipulates that at some point 
increasing the number of black and Hispanic members comes at 
the expense of reducing the influence of black and Hispanic vot-
ers in districts with more conservative white (non-Hispanic) rep-
resentatives. In fact, the most important debate over minority 
representation is whether there is a tradeoff and if there is, how 
severe is it? 
Most scholars agree that there generally is a tradeoff between 
descriptive and substantive minority representation. In some 
places, however, like urban areas in the Northeast, there is no 
tradeoff because of large concentrations of minority populations 
that live in close proximity to majority populations that share the 
same partisan preferences (see Cameron, Epstein, and 
O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997b ). The tradeoff is most evident in 
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the South where voting is more racially polarized since it is more 
often the case that a majority of whites prefer a candidate op-
posed by a majority of Blacks or Hispanics. 
The first step in establishing whether a tradeoff exists is to 
determine what percentage of a district's minority population is 
necessary to achieve descriptive representation. If the minority 
population in a district is greater than the percentage needed to 
elect the minority population's candidate of choice then it fol-
lows that substantive minority representation has been compro-
mised because the excess number of minority voters could have 
been placed in other districts where they could have an influence 
on electoral outcomes. 
The actual minority percentage necessary for descriptive rep-
resentation has been estimated in several studies. Lublin (1997a; 
1997b) estimated the percent black and Hispanic necessary to 
elect black and Hispanic representatives, respectively, based on 
congressional elections from 1972-1994. In his models, Lublin 
includes a district's percent black and percent Hispanic popula-
tion as explanatory variables for the probability of electing a 
black or Hispanic representative. Controls are included for sev-
eral other demographic factors, but Lublin finds that percent 
black and Hispanic are the only factors that account for whether 
a minority is elected. Lublin finds a 55% black district popula-
tion is enough to ensure the election of a Black (probability is 
.86). This result assumes that the Hispanic population is zero. An 
increase in the Hispanic population lowers the black population 
necessary to elect a Black American. In addition, Lublin finds 
that a 55% Hispanic population ensures (probability is .84) the 
election of a Hispanic provided that at least 85% of the district 
population has lived in the state for at least five years. Lublin is 
wise to stress that "[l]ocal differences should be taken into ac-
count when determining the threshold at which a congressional 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 7 
district will probably elect a black [ or Hispanic] representative" 
(1997b, 48). 
Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran (1996), and Epstein and 
O'Halloran (1999a; 1999b; 2000) regress the probability of 
electing a black Democrat on the black voting age population 
(BVAP), controlling for region. In the 1990s, for every region of 
the United States a BVAP less than 50% gives a Black candidate 
at least an equal chance of winning election. These studies stress 
the BVAP percent where there is a .50 probability of electing a 
black Democrat because this is the minimum threshold for the 
minority community to have an equal chance of electing their 
candidate of choice (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999b). The point 
of equal opportunity for electing a black Democrat is highly 
variable across space and time. Based on the 1992 elections 
(103rd Congress), Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran (1996) find 
the point of equal opportunity for electing a black Democrat is a 
BVAP of 40.29% in the South, 47.29% in the Northwest, and 
only 28.43% in the Northeast. Epstein and O'Halloran (1999a, 
190; 2000, 100) show that the point of equal opportunity for 
electing a black Democrat has declined over time and across all 
regions: (1) South: BVAP = 50.7% in 1974, 54.9% in 1984, and 
40.4% in 1994, (2) East: 49.4%, 52.8%, and 47.6%, and (3) 
Other (rest of the U.S.): 41.9%, 27.0%, and 29.0%.3 
In the 1990s, a debate ensued over the minimum minority 
population required to establish descriptive representation. The 
participants in this debate have spent much ink talking past each 
other. For example, although Lublin (1997a; 1997b) does not 
divide his results by region in his analysis, the point of equal op-
3 The South is Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The North-
east/East is Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia. The 
Northwest/Other are the remaining states. 
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portunity for electing a Black American (assuming zero percent 
Hispanic) is less than 50%. Lublin's finding is probably statisti-
cally indistinguishable from the results in Cameron, Epstein, and 
O'Halloran (1996) and Epstein and O'Halloran (1999a; 1999b; 
2000) since the BVAP necessary for an equal chance of electing 
a black Democrat in the South (in the 1990s) falls between 40 
and 50%.4 Lublin stressed that a greater than 50% black popula-
tion was necessary to ensure the election of a Black, but Cam-
eron, Epstein, and O'Halloran ( 1996) and Epstein and 
O'Halloran (1999a; 1999b; 2000) focus on the point of equal 
opportunity. Based on their estimates, it is also the case that a 
greater than 50% black population is needed to guarantee the 
election of a black Democrat, at least in the South. 
In the South several black incumbent Democrats whose dis-
tricts were made majority white won reelection. In 1996, black 
incumbent Democrats Sanford Bishop (GA 2nd district), Cynthia 
McKinney (GA 4~, and Corrine Brown (FL 3rd) won reelection 
in districts that were about 27, 40, and 39% black, respectively 
(Voss and Lublin 2001 ). Based on their analysis of these elec-
tions, Voss and Lublin (2001) claim that the incumbency advan-
tage does not explain ( except for perhaps Sanford Bishop) why 
these black incumbents won reelection. Instead, Voss and Lublin 
contend that the ongoing realignment of southern whites in favor 
of the Republican party explains how black Democrats can now 
win election in minority influence districts-districts on the or-
der of about 40% black. Because a majority of southern whites 
are now Republican voters, black voters now comprise a major-
ity of the Democratic primary electorate in many districts that 
are majority Democratic. Thus, black voters can elect a Black in 
4 The Epstein and O'Halloran analysis (1999b) is based on data from State Senate elec-
tions (1988-1994) in South Carolina; the point of equal opportunity for electing an Afri-
can American is about 47% BV AP. 
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the primary and there are enough whites who support the De-
mocratic party to elect the Democratic nominee regardless of 
their race (Voss and Lublin 2001 ). 
Voss and Lublin (2001) conclude there is no white backlash 
in districts with substantial black populations. In other words, as 
the percentage black in a district increases, whites do not re-
spond by voting in favor of the candidate opposed by most Black 
voters. On the contrary, white voters in majority-minority and 
minority influence districts are more Democratic than whites 
who reside in districts with low minority populations. As Voss 
(2000) argues, proximity among the races does not breed politi-
cal contempt in terms of racially polarized voting. The absence 
of racially polarized voting is plausible because the redistricting 
plans in most southern states were drawn to concentrate the most 
Republican voters in districts represented by Republicans. There-
fore, those white voters most likely to oppose minority pref erred 
candidates do not live in majority-minority or minority influence 
districts. 
PARTY COMPETITION 
Most scholars agree that redistricting contributed to Republi-
can electoral gains in the 1990s (but see Engstrom 1995). There 
is, however, substantial disagreement over the extent to which 
racial redistricting advantaged the GOP (Canon 1999a; Lublin 
1999b). In this section I examine the conventional wisdom that 
racial redistricting disproportionately benefited Republican can-
didates. I present several studies that provide the number of GOP 
wins attributed to racial redistricting. Next, I discuss several 
studies that address the impact of 1990s redistricting on party 
competition. Finally, I discuss a study that makes a strong case 
that racial redistricting played a minimal role in Republican suc-
cess. 
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Table 2 presents the total number of seats held by each party 
and according to region from 1990 through 2000. There are three 
patterns worth noting : (1) the massive nationwide shift of seats 
TABLE2 
NUMBER OF U.S. HOUSE SEA TS HELD BY 
EACH PARTY FROM 1990-20 00 
South 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Republicans 
Democrats 
Difference 
Non-South 
Republicans 
Democrats 
Difference 
Nation 
39 48 64 71 
77 77 61 54 
-38 -29 3 17 
127 
191 
-64 
128 
181 
-53 
166 
143 
23 
156 
153 
3 
71 
54 
17 
152 
157 
-5 
2000 
71 
53 
18 
151 
158 
-7 
Republicans 166 17 6 230 227 223 222 
Democrats 268 258 204 207 211 211 
Difference -102 -82 26 20 12 11 
SOURCE: Data for 1992-2000 elections are from Table 1.1 in Black and 
Black (2002) . 1990 election data compiled by the author from The Alma-
nac of American Politics (1991 ). 
going to the GOP in 1994, (2) the continual increase in the num-
ber of Republican seats in the South, and (3) the decline in Re-
publican seats in the Non-South since the 1996 election. 
The national Republican tide in 1994 increased the number of 
Republicans in the South by one-third and the non-S outh by 
30%. After 1994, regional patterns diverge as the South contin-
ues to gain Republican seats while the Non-South continues to 
lose them. Furthermore, the partisan balance in the South was 
constant between 1988 and 1990-39 Republicans and 127 De-
mocrats. Republican advances in the South commence in 1992 
with a gain of nine seats for the GOP in the first election held 
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under the newly drawn congressional districts . In the non-South, 
it appears 1994 was a short-term deviating election with national 
conditions that swung heavily in favor of the GOP. In the South, 
the evidence suggests 1994 was a critical election that reinforced 
a trend in favor of the Republican party that began in 1992. 
The timing (1992) and the surge of Republican gains (con-
centrated between 1992 and 1996) in the South has led many 
scholars to argue that racial redistricting played a significant 
role. Thirteen out of the fifteen new black majority districts were 
created in the South (see Table I) . Furthermore, the sharp decline 
in the number of white Democrats corresponded with the in-
crease in the number of black Democrats and the even larger in-
crease in the number of Republicans. 
Racial redistricting benefits Republicans if enough black vot-
ers are packed5 into a majority-minority district to cause at least 
one neighboring district's whiter constituency to elect the Repub-
lican candidate in a seat previously held by a Democrat. Ceteris 
paribus, the only way Republicans would not benefit from racial 
redistricting that packs minority voters is if the minority popula-
tion for the majority-minority district was taken entirely from 
districts represented by Republicans (assuming the GOP does not 
already control every seat in the state).6 In this case, racial redis-
5 
"Packed" means there are more voters than necessary to elect a Democrat. 
6 It is possible that if the minority percentage in a Democratic district was well below 
50%, a reduction in the minority population could be offset with a more Democratic 
population if a larger share of the white population was also replaced with a more De-
mocratic white population . An equal exchange between white and black voters always 
favors the GOP because the typical black voter is much more supportive of Democratic 
candidates. Shotts (200 I; 2002) points out that in a heavily Republican state the require-
ment to create a majority-minority district can reduce the number of Republicans elected . 
This possibility has yet to present itself in the South because the Democratic party is still 
competitive and the black population has proven large enough to prevent the Republican 
party from capturing every seat in a given state. However, if the movement of whites in 
favor of the GOP continues, it is possible that a state like, say, Tennessee could be en-
tirely Republican if its one majority-minority district was dismantled . Then again, the 
Note continues 
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tricting would lead to a one-to-one exchange where a minority 
Democrat wins election at the expense of a white Democrat and 
the number of Republicans remains the same. Because of geo-
graphic constraints and the fact that the percentage of the minor-
ity population in districts represented by Republicans was 
already much lower than the percentage for Democrats prior to 
redistricting (Hill 1995; Overby and Cosgrove 1996), most of the 
minority populations in new majority-minority districts were in 
fact taken from districts represented by white Democrats (Grose 
2001; Handley, Grofinan, and Arden 1998; Lublin and Voss 
2000; McKee 2002). Thus it appears that racial redistricting must 
have benefited the Republican party and the question that re-
mains is the extent to which the GOP benefited. 
Table 3 lists several studies that quantify the number of Re-
publican wins because of racial redistricting. Almost all of these 
estimates consist of seats won by the GOP in the South because, 
as previously mentioned, only two new black majority districts 
were created outside the South. In the South the GOP netted nine 
seats in 1992 and sixteen more in 1994. Most of the studies in 
Table 3 claim a third or more of Republican victories between 
1992 and 1994 were caused by racial redistricting. 
A word of caution is in order with respect to Table 3. Most of 
the studies fail to control for other factors that may have ac-
counted for these GOP wins. The most common method em-
ployed to calculate these estimates is a simple count of the seats 
where "the number of black voters removed from a district ex-
ceeds the GOP victory margin" (Bullock 1995a, 22). The excep-
tions are Grofman and Handley (1998), and Hill (1995). 
Grofman and Handley employ a decomposition model to sepa-
rate the number of seats won by Republicans independent of re-
VRA would prevent this scenario because dissecting the large concentrated black popula-
tion in the Memphis area would be considered minority vote dilution. 
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TABLE3 
NUMBER OF REPUBLICAN SEAT GAINS DUE TO 
RACIAL REDISTRJCTING 
Author and Year Net GOP Elections 
seats 
Beachler (1995) 
Benenson ( 1992) 
Bositis* (n.d.) 
Bullock (1995a) 
Bullock (1995b) 
Grofman and Handley (1998) 
Hill (1995) 
Lublin (1995) 
Lublin (1997b) 
Lublin and Voss (2000) 
McKee (2002) 
Swain (1995) 
4-5 
3 
~17 
6-9 
~13 
2-11 
~7 
9 
~9 
11 
4 
> 17 
•Toe estimate for Bositis is cited by Lublin (1997b, 112-113) . 
1992 
1992 
1992-1994 
1992-1994 
1992-1994 
1990-1994 
1992-1994 
1992-1994 
1992-1994 
1992-1994 
1992 
1992-1994 
districting (behavioral change) and the seats won as a result of 
redistricting (compositional change). They find that most of the 
seats won by the GOP in the South from 1990 to 1994 were be-
cause of a rise in Republican voting not related to the effect of 
racial redistricting. At most, no more than 11 Republican seats 
can be attributed to race-based redistricting and even if this 
number is correct, the Republican party would still have won the 
House in 1994 even if no seats were won as a result of racial re-
districting. 1 
Kevin Hill (1995) employs the Judgelt predictive program 
designed by Gelman and King (1994) to evaluate the impact of 
7 See Engstrom (1995) for a discussion that goes so far as to almost completely discount 
the evidence for racial redistricting leading to GOP gains . See Lublin and Voss (2000) for 
a criticism of the decomposition method employed by Grofman and Handley (1998) . 
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race-based redistricting on Republican wins in 1992 and 1994 
among the eight southern states that created new black majority 
districts.' Because of their large reductions in black populations, 
Hill considers four GOP wins, Alabama's 6th, Georgia's 1 si, 3rd, 
and 4th Districts to be a result of racial redistricting in the 1992 
elections. Hill's multivariate analysis regresses the percent of the 
1992 Democratic House vote on the percent of the 1992 GOP 
presidential vote, a dummy for incumbency, a dummy for con-
tested seats, district percent black in 1992, and the change in the 
percent black between 1992 and 1990. The change in the percent 
black is the variable of interest and contro11ing for the other fac-
tors, Hill's model predicts the above mentioned four GOP wins. 
Hill runs the model again for the 1992 elections using the 1990 
district racial compositions and finds that the Democrats would 
have held onto the four seats actually won by Republicans. Fi-
nally, Hill runs his model for the 1994 elections based on 1992 
data and it predicts three more GOP victories due to racial redis-
tricting (Districts 8 and 10 in Georgia and District 2 in North 
Carolina). 
In a follow-up piece, Hill and Rae (2000) use Judgelt to pre-
dict individual House elections in the South from 1988 to 1996. 
Using a multivariate analysis to predict the district share of the 
Democratic House vote, Hill and Rae find that their variable of 
interest, the percent black in the district is only significant in 
1992, suggesting the importance of redistricting. Employing the 
counterfactual condition that the 1990 districts remained in place 
and that the incumbents who retired in 1990 ran for reelection, 
Hill and Rae find the Republican takeover would not have oc-
curred until 1996. In other words, racial redistricting "probably 
1 These states are Alabama (7111), Florida (3rd, 17111, 23rd), Georgia (2nd , 11111), Louisiana 
(4111), North Carolina (l", 12111), South Carolina (6111), Texas (18111, 30111), and Virginia (3rd). 
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gave the GOP the prize 2 years too early" (Hill and Rae 2000, 
18). 
Among these several studies, it is evident that there is consid-
erable variance in the number of GOP wins deemed to be a result 
of racial redistricting. It appears that the growth in southern Re-
publicanism in the 1990s was so robust that racial redistricting 
was a contributory factor, but perhaps it was not even a neces-
sary condition for the GOP to take control of the House before 
the end of the decade. For instance, Hill (1995) documents that 
many districts were trending Republican even in the absence of a 
change in racial composition. 
But before discounting the impact of redistricting, it is impor-
tant to consider that most studies have focused primarily on the 
direct effect of racial redistricting on party competition. In the 
South, beyond reducing the black populations outside of major-
ity-minority districts, redistricting and reapportionment had the 
effect of making these districts more Republican and politically 
unstable because a large percentage of districts contained new 
constituents. 
Perhaps the most important impediment to Republican ascen-
dancy in the South was the incumbency advantage that southern 
Democrats enjoyed since the end of Reconstruction. The growth 
of southern Republicanism has been top-down with most white 
voters preferring Republican presidential candidates since the 
1960s (see Aistrup 1996). In presidential contests the South be-
came a Republican bastion in the 1980s, providing a large chunk 
of guaranteed electoral votes (Black and Black 1992). And de-
spite Clinton's wins in 1992 and 1996, the South remains the 
most presidentially Republican region in the nation. In fact , a 
Democrat in the White House appears to have been just what 
was needed for Republican advancement in House elections (see 
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Jacobson 1990).9 The 1992 elections marked a substantial declin e 
in the portion of white southerners who split their tickets in favor 
of the Republican nominee for president and the Democrat for 
the House (35% in 1988, 18% in 1992). Not surprisingly, there 
was a corresponding increase in the share of whites who vote d a 
straight Republican ticket (32% in 1988, 41 % in 1992). 10 
Several scholars have noted the precarious situation of so 
many southern Democrats who represented districts that voted 
Republican in presidential contests. Campbell (1997) labeled 
these districts split-result districts and found that the Republic an 
takeover in 1994 was because of GOP gains in these districts . 
Jacobson (1996; 2000) and Abramowitz (1995) both show that 
the GOP's strongest candidates (based on prior elective experi-
ence and funding) targeted split-result districts and that a dispro-
portionate number of these districts account for Republic an 
success in the 1990s. 
More than any other scholars, Earl and Merle Black (2002) 
have demonstrated the broader importance of redistricting in 
contributing to southern Republican gains. Their findings sug-
gest that redistricting was vital to the rise of southern Rep ubli-
cans in House elections in the 1990s. Redistricting provide d new 
racial foundations more favorable to Republicans. But in addi-
tion to whiter districts, redistricting made these districts much 
more Republican based on presidential voting. In effect, redis-
tricting widened the split in so-called split-result districts, puttin g 
southern Democrats at even greater electoral risk. 
New racial foundations made it easier for Republican candi-
dates to win elections since most Republicans require over-
whelming white support given that Blacks typically vote 
9 Jacobson (1990) shows that since 1946, "Democrats have won fewest House seats when 
losing the presidency, [and] second fewest at midterm elections with a Democrat in the 
White House" (135). 
10 These numbers come from the author's analysis of National Election Studies data . 
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upwards of 90% Democratic. A reduction in black constituents 
meant a lower share of the white vote would be needed for Re-
publicans to win election. Black and Black (2002, 334-335) note 
that before redistricting more than 60% of southern districts had 
black populations of at least 15%; after redistricting, "nearly half 
( 46 percent) of the southern districts had black populations of 
Jess than 15 percent." Although in several instances Democratic 
line drawers were able to concentrate Republican strength in a 
limited number of districts (Beachler 1998; Canon 1999a), over-
all, lower black populations served to disperse Republican sup-
port. Black and Black find that after redistricting, "the number of 
Republican presidential landslide districts [60% or more of the 
two-party vote] increased from fifty-three to sixty-five" (2002, 
335).11 
So what was the success rate for Republican candidates in 
districts made more favorable to their party? Here is what Black 
and Black found: (1) The GOP won 30 of 53 (57%) Republican 
presidential landslide districts in 1988 and 42 of 65 (65%) land-
slide districts in 1992; (2) Republican dominance was confined 
to Republican presidential landslide districts less than 15% black 
and these districts increased from 28 to 41 after redistricting; (3) 
The GOP won 64% (18 of 28) of Republican presidential land-
slide districts under 15% black in 1990 and captured 80% (33 of 
41) of these districts in 1992; (4) In 1994 the GOP won 95% (39 
of 41) of Republican presidential landslide districts under 15% 
black; (5) Between 1990 and 1994 the GOP gained 25 seats in 
Republican presidential landslide districts giving the party 55 of 
these 65 districts (2002, 335-338). 
According to Black and Black, "[i]n order for the Republi-
cans to take advantage of the grassroots Reagan realignment, 
11 Black and Black (2002) compare the 1988 Republican presidential vote for districts 
before and after redistricting . 
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presidentially Republican districts held by Democrats would 
have to be destabilized" (2002, 331). Black and Black provide 
compelling evidence that redistricting did not just accelerate an 
ongoing partisan realignment. Rather it was a structural compo-
nent necessary for Republican advancement in southern House 
elections. The number of split-result districts drastically declined 
as redistricting made them even more vulnerable to strong Re-
publican challenges. 
Similar to Black and Black (2002), Petrocik and Desposato 
( 1998) find that the destabilizing effect of redistricting benefited 
the GOP. However, Petrocik and Desposato depart from most 
scholars by offering a more nuanced argument that heavily dis-
counts the impact of race-based redistricting on Republican ad-
vancement in the South between 1992 and 1994. They contend 
that Republican gains were mainly a consequence of the pro-
Republican voting behavior of "new" constituents located in dis-
tricts represented by Democratic incumbents. The creation of 
majority-minority districts was the first-order effect that led to 
the shuffling of so many voters into districts with different in-
cumbents running for reelection in 1992 and 1994. The second-
order effect was the loss of familiar voters, or rather, an increase 
in the number of new constituents, "defined as individuals who 
were in a different incumbent's district prior to the redistricting" 
(1998, 616). 
To assess the significance of the frrst-order effect, Petrocik 
and Desposato regress the share of the Democratic House vote 
on the change in a district's percent black. This is done sepa-
rately for 1992 and 1994. Change in the percent black is signifi-
cant in 1992, but not in 1994. The second-order effect is 
evaluated by regressing the Democratic House vote on a dis-
trict's percent new constituents. The percent new has a negative 
and significant effect on the Democratic vote in 1992 and 1994. 
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According to Petrocik and Desposato, given the constancy of 
Democratic support among black voters, the only possible ex-
planation for Republican gains was an increase in Republican 
support from white voters. Based on an examination of National 
Election Study surveys, redistricting alone, as a consequence of 
race-based redistricting (the first-order effect), would not provide 
enough white voters to secure Republican victories in 1992 and 
1994 if the previous levels of Democratic support among white 
southerners (white Democrats, white Independents, and white 
Republicans) remained at their 1990 levels. 
Petrocik and Desposato ( 1998, 616) claim that "the key factor 
[for Republican gains] was the second-order effect of losing fa-
miliar voters. This loss of familiar constituents was more impor-
tant than the first-order effect of a reduced black constituency." 
So with respect to the effect of redistricting on Republican 
gains, new voters were the crucial factor in tipping the balance in 
favor of Republican candidates in the 1992 and 1994 elections. 
Petrocik and Desposato contend that many of the plans adminis-
tered by Democratically controlled state legislatures essentially 
backfired. 12 Assuming voting behavior remained at its pre-
redistricting level, the Democrats may have even benefited from 
redistricting, "[h]owever, an impossible-to-anticipate, large anti-
Democratic tide undermined a 'friendly' redistricting that had 
every prospect ofleaving the Democrats in charge" (Petrocik and 
Desposato 1998, 630). 
Petrocik and Desposato provide a convincing explanation for 
why the Democratic incumbency advantage was weakened by 
redistricting. New voters did not have a bond with the new in-
cumbent they found representing them as a consequence of re-
12 Most of the southern states had Democratic legislatures (AR, FL, GA, NC, lN , TX, 
and VA), and the rest were divided between the two parties (AL, LA, MS, SC) during the 
initial redistricting following the 1990 census (Niemi and Abramowitz I 994, 8 I 3). 
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districting. Since most of these voters were white and thus voted 
Republican in presidential contests, the lack of familiarity with 
their Democratic incumbent made it much more likely that new 
voters would view the elections of 1992 and 1994 (to a lesser 
extent) as open seat contests ( even if the incumbent sought re-
election) and fall back on their partisanship as exhibited in pres i-
dential contests and thus vote for the Republican challenger. And 
even though Republican incumbents actually inherited districts 
that averaged a higher portion of new constituents, 3 7% for Re-
publicans v. 21 % for the Democrats (Petrocik and Desposato 
1998, 625), these new voters were partial to the GOP. But in the 
final analysis, Petrocik and Desposato argue that it was not so 
much new voters as it was a Republican tide that accounted for 
GOP gains in 1992 and 1994. In effect, they opt for a realign-
ment style explanation, not redistricting , as the primary reason 
for GOP success in the South in 1992 and 1994. 
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIVENESS 
The narrower focus of research that evaluates the impact of 
redistricting on legislative responsiveness has produced several 
studies that take very similar methodological approaches. In this 
section I explain what is meant by legislative responsiveness and 
provide the rationale for how redistricting may affect it. Then, I 
discuss the results of eight studies that measure the impact of 
redistricting on representatives' roll-call voting behavior .13 
Legislative responsiveness refers to the extent to which mem-
bers adjust their behavior in an effort to meet the demands of 
13 See Canon (1999b) for a strong criticism of using roll-call voting behavior as a de-
pendent variable to gauge legislative responsiveness . Canon notes that the interest group 
ratings that comprise the dependent variable in most studies are not sufficient to distin-
guish the interests of blacks and whites and roll-calls contain the "censored data" prob-
lem because these votes necessarily measure only the end of the legislative process. 
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their constituents. By altering the partisan and racial composi-
tions of districts, it is plausible that redistricting affects the re-
sponsiveness of representatives. For instance, Democrats whose 
districts are made more Republican may respond by taking more 
conservative positions as reflected in their rhetoric and docu-
mented in their voting behavior. In the literature, "[r]espon-
siveness refers to the change in representatives' roll-call voting 
that can be attributed to district-level ideological change, con-
trolling for relevant variables" (Sharpe 2001, 278). 
In the 1990s, several studies have evaluated whether redis-
tricting affected legislative responsiveness. I confine my discus-
sion here to eight of these studies. Table 4 provides information 
on these studies. Although several different vote score types are 
used for the dependent variables in this research, all but two 
studies include the change in the district percent black (1992%-
1990%) as a key explanatory variable. In addition, only the study 
by Grose (2001) evaluates responsiveness based on court-
ordered redistricting that occurred after the decennial redistrict-
ing for the 1992 elections. 
Limiting his analysis to the South, Bullock (1995c) measures 
responsiveness according to separate regressions with change in 
Conservative Coalition (CC) scores as the dependent variable 
and change in Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) 
scores as the dependent variable.1• By running separate regres-
sions for these two models controlling for party, an increase in 
the percent black causes Democrats to vote more liberal on CC 
scores and more in favor of civil rights (LCCR scores). The 
change in percent black has no impact on the responsiveness of 
14 The CC score is calculated by subtracting the scores from the 102nd Congress from the 
1993 scores and LCCR scores from 102nd Congress subtracted from seven roll call votes 
that the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies considered to be "crucial to 
African Americans" (the LCCR scores were not yet available for 1993) (Bullock 1995c, 
146). 
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TABLE4 
SAMPLE OF STUDIES THAT ASSESS THE EFFECT OF 
REDISTRICTING ON LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIVENESS 
Bullock (1995c)" 
Change in percent black affects responsive-
ness of all members. Running models for 
Main Finding black and white Democrats however, shows 
change in percent black only affects respon-
siveness of black Democrats . 
VoreMeasure(l)qlmdmtVariable) CC; LCCR 
Congress I 03rd 
Key Independent Variable(s) Change in percent black 
Grose (2001) 
Reduction in percent black due to redistricting 
between 1993 and 2000 causes black Democ-
rats to become more conservative on ideo-
Main Finding logical voting and more liberal on civil rights 
voting. Increase in percent black makes white 
Republicans more conservative on civil rights 
voting. 
Vore Measure(l)qlmdmt Variable) W-NOMIN A TE; LCCR 
Congress I 03 - I 06' 
Key Independent Variable(s) Change in percent black 
Hu_rley & J{err (1997) 
Analyzing I 03rd and 104th Congresses sepa-
rately . Generally, new Democrats and new 
Republican members in both Congresses are 
Main Findin more liberal ~d conservative, respective!~, 
g compared to mcumbent members of their 
party. New minority Democrats are more 
liberal than all other new Democrats in 103rd 
Congress. 
VoreMeasure(DqlmdentVarable) Party unity scores; Party unity scores on key 
votes 
Congress 103'; 104 
K I d d t v , ble( ) New member (Democrat or Republican); New ey n epen en ana 5 member (Minority Democrat in I 03rd) 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
IMPACT OF CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 23 
TABLE 4 (continued) 
LeVeaux & Grand (2003) 
Increase in percent black and post-
redistricting percent black cause Democrats to 
become more liberal . Large change (?. I 0%) 
in percent black makes Democrats more re-
. . . sponsive; a large decline (?. 10%) in percent 
Mam Fmdmg black makes Democrats much more conserva-
tive. Increase in post-redistricting percent 
black makes Republicans more conservative 
and large decline in percent black makes Re-
publicans even more conservative . 
Vote Measure (Depeodent Variable) AD A 
Congress 103rd 
Change in percent black; percent black post-
Key Independent Variable(s) redistricting; Large change in percent black 
(10% or more) 
Overby & Cosgrove ( 1996) 
Limited analysis to white incumbents, change 
in percent black affects responsiveness . When 
. . . models are run according to party, change in 
Mam Fmdmg percent black does not affect Republican vot-
mg, but white Democrats remam responsive 
even controlling for region . 
Vote Measure (Dependent Variable) COPE 
Congress I 03' 
Key Independent Variable(s) Change in percent black 
Sharpe & Garand (200 I) 
For all incumbents, change in percent black 
and percent black post-redistncting caused 
more liberal voting. For white incumbents, 
only change in percent black caused more lib-
eral voting. Separating members by region 
M . F" d. (South/Non-South), shows both variables affect 
am rn mg voting for southerners and only post-
redistricting percent black affects voting of 
non-southerners. A large change (?. 10%) in 
percent black has an even greater effect on 
voting for all members whether or not control-
ling for race (whites only) or region. 
VoteMeu.u-e(Depende Variable) ADA 
Congress I 03rd 
Change m percent black; percent black ~st-
Key Independent Variable(s) redistricting; Large change in percent black (100/o 
or more 
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the LCCR voting is not significant. The evidence from Bullock 
(1995c) and Whitby (1997) strongly suggests that it is the elec-
tion of black Democrats from black majority districts who ac-
count for redistricting-induced legislative responsiveness based 
on a change in the percent black. And based on difference of 
means tests, Hurley and Kerr (1997) find that newly elected mi-
nority Democrats from new majority-minority districts are sig-
nificantly more liberal than all other newly elected Democrats 
according to average party unity scores and average party unity 
scores on key votes in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994).'5 
The findings of Sharpe and Garand (2001), Overby and 
Cosgrove (1996), and LeVeaux and Garand (2003) are not con-
sistent with Bullock (1995c) and Whitby (1997). It appears that 
one reason for the difference is that the former studies are limited 
to incumbent members whereas Bullock and Whitby include 
dummies for freshman Democrats and freshman Republicans. 
Sharpe and Garand (2001) do not run separate models according 
to party. They run four models: (1) all House members, (2) only 
white members, (3) southern members, and (4) non-southern 
members. In all four models the change in percent black posi-
tively impacts a member's Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA) rating (a higher score is more liberal). The most impor-
tant finding in this research is that a very large change in percent 
black, 10% or more, has a much stronger impact on responsive-
ness; this points to a threshold effect where district changes may 
have to be substantial in order to affect the responsiveness of 
certain members. 
Contrary to Bullock (1995c) and Whitby (1997), Overby and 
Cosgrove (1996) find that white southern Democrats are respon-
sive to a change in the racial composition of their districts. An 
15 The scores for newly elected minority Democrats from new majority-minority districts 
are not different from those of incumbent minority Democrats (Hurley and Kerr 1997). 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
Author finds that members are responsive to 
changes in the partisan composition of their 
constituency based on NOMINATE scores 
because members exhibit more conservative 
M I F. di voting behavior if their districts are made less 
• n m ng Democratic through redistricting prior to the 
1992 elections. Furthennore, the author shows 
that more senior members are slightly less 
responsive to partisan changes in their dis-
tricts. 
Vote Measure (DEpendent Variilie) D-NOMIN A TE 
Congress 103rd 
Key Independent Varlable(s) Change in NOMINATE score 
Whitby (1997) 
Change in percent black affects responsive -
ness of southern members in states that ere-
. . ated new black majority districts. The 
Mam Fmdlng relationship holds when reducing the model to 
just Democrats, but does not hold for just 
white Democrats. 
Vote Measure (Dependent Variilie) LCCR 
Congress I 03rd 
Key Independent Varlable(s) Change in percent black 
Republicans. Taking his analysis a step farther, Bullock runs 
separate models for white and black Democrats, finding that the 
change in percent black no longer affects white Democrats' re-
sponsiveness but it does affect black Democrats for both CC and 
LCCR scores. 
Whitby' study (1997) corroborates Bullock's findings 
(1995c). Whitby limits his analysis to the eight southern states 
that created black majority districts for the 1992 elections. 
Whitby runs three models to evaluate a change in percent black 
on the LCCR scores for (1) all members in these states, (2) a 
model just for Democrats, and (3) a model for white Democrats. 
For white Democrats, the effect of a change in percent black on 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
26 MCKEE 
increase in the percent black as a result of redistricting positively 
impacts these members' Committee on Political Education 
(COPE) rating (higher scores are more liberal). However, as Bul-
lock found (1995c), the change in percent black has no effect on 
the responsiveness of Republicans. LeVeaux and Garand (2003) 
run separate models for incumbent Democrats and Republicans 
to estimate the effect of a change in percent Black population on 
ADA scores. In addition, they assess the impact of a large change 
(equal or greater than 10%) in percent black on responsiveness. 
For Republican incumbents, an increase in percent black nega-
tively affected their ADA scores. No Republicans experienced a 
large increase in black population, but many experienced a large 
decrease (10% or more) in their black populations because of 
redistricting, and these members exhibited even more conserva-
tive voting as reflected in over a 2.5 point reduction in ADA 
scores. 
In contrast to Republicans, Democratic incumbents were 
much more responsive to large changes in the percent Black 
population. In addition to the change in percent black increasing 
Democrats' ADA scores, a large change increased Democrats' 
ADA scores by over five points; a l 0% or higher increase in 
black population had no effect; a 10% or higher decrease in 
black population caused a reduction in ADA scores of more than 
eight points. The reason large increases in the black population 
have no effect is because Democrats are already highly respon-
sive (have high ADA scores) to black constituents because black 
voters are part of the core constituency of most Democrats. In 
other words, most of these incumbent Democrats depend on 
black votes for reelection. Nonetheless, compared to Republi-
cans whose core constituents are white voters, a large reduction 
in the black population places Democrats at greater electoral risk 
and thus they respond by exhibiting more conservative roll-call 
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voting behavior to retain the electoral support of white moder-
ates. 
The Grose study (2001) departs from the other seven studies 
by focusing on the roll-call voting behavior of southern represen-
tatives in the case of court-ordered redistricting that reduced the 
black populations in several black majority districts from 1993 to 
2000.16 Running separate regressions for white Democrats, white 
Republicans, and black Democrats, Grose finds that a change in 
the black population only affects Poole and Rosenthal W-
NOMINATE scores of black Democrats. Since the populations 
of black Democrats have been reduced, making them majority 
white because of court-ordered redistricting, it makes sense that 
black Democrats respond by voting more conservatively accord-
ing to NOMINATE scores. Similar to LeVeaux and Garand's 
(2003) explanation, black Democrats recognize that an increase 
in white constituents means they will have to respond by voting 
more conservative because a portion of the white voters need to 
be part of the core constituency for black Democrats to win re-
election. 
It is interesting, however, that when regressions are run with 
LCCR scores as the dependent variable, black Democrats who 
lose black constituents respond by voting more in favor of civil 
rights issues. Civil rights issues are of great concern to black 
constituents and since they still comprise the foundation of the 
primary constituency for black Democrats in white majority dis-
tricts, these members have to guard against potential opponents 
who could run to the left of them if these members reduced their 
support for civil rights. A change in the percent black has no ef-
fect on white Democrats' LCCR scores, but it does affect the 
16 Considerable changes to congressional boundaries were made for the following south-
ern states: Florida (1996 election), Georgia (1996), Louisiana (1994 and 1996), North 
Carolina (1998 and 2000), Texas (1996), and Virginia (1998) (Grose 2001, 212). 
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scores of white Republicans who respond to an increase in black 
population by reducing their support on civil rights legislati on. 
Similar to the explanation for black Democrats who gained white 
constituents, white Republicans who gained black voters "were 
worried about primary challenges from moderate Republicans. In 
order to win primaries, these Republicans became more conser-
vative on civil rights ... to appeal to conservative voter bases" 
(Grose 2001, 212). 
Finally, Sharpe (2001) extends the work of Glazer and Rob-
bins (1985) to the 1990s to test whether a change in the partis an 
composition of a district affects a member's roll-call voting on 
Poole and Rosenthal D-NOMINATE scores. The key variable of 
interest is the change in NOMINATE score, calculated by multi-
plying the coefficient from the district Democratic presidenti al 
vote in 1988 (the independent variable in a separate model) by 
the difference in the district Democratic presidential vote in 
1988, before and after redistricting (see Sharpe 2001, 279). The 
NOMINATE score will be positive as the Democratic composi-
tion decreases. Therefore a reduction in the Democratic composi-
tion is expected to cause members to respond by casting more 
conservative votes. Sharpe finds that members are in fact respon-
sive to changes in the partisan composition of their constituen cy 
based on NOMINATE scores because members exhibit more 
conservative voting behavior if their districts are made less De-
mocratic by redistricting for the 1992 elections. 
These eight studies vary considerably in their findings, but 
there is enough evidence to support some tentative conclusi ons . 
First, in general, members are responsive to redistricting-ind uced 
change. Republican members generally are not affected by a 
change in the percent black in their districts because Black voters 
do not support them. As a whole, Democratic members are re-
sponsive to a change in the racial composition of their distri cts, 
but the evidence is mixed with respect to the subpopulation of 
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white southerners. Large changes ( I 0% or more) in the percent 
black in a district leads to greater responsiveness on the part of 
Republicans and Democrats. Republicans respond by voting 
more conservatively in the face of a substantial increase in the 
black population whereas Democrats vote more conservatively 
when their black constituencies decline by a large amount. 17 De-
spite using many different measures for the dependent variable 
and including different variables in the multivariate models, the 
responsiveness of representatives to 1990s redistricting suggests 
that members act in accordance with the incentive to be re-
elected. 
CONTROVERSIES IN THE LITERATURE 
In this section I discuss several of the controversies that have 
emerged from each of the three literatures on redistricting. There 
are certainly more disagreements than the ones I present, but I 
consider these to be the most important. 
Minority Representation and Legislative Responsiveness 
In the case of minority representation and legislative respon-
siveness, two interdependent debates worth considering are: (1) 
17 The literature on legislative responsiveness may explain Overby and Brown's (2002) 
finding that an increase in the black population in the South negatively impacted white 
incumbent Democrat's share of the two-party vote in 1994. I think the reason for the 
decline is that an increase in percent black caused Democratic incumbents to be respon-
sive to black interests (e.g., in their roll-call voting behavior) and they were punished at 
the polls by their white constituents who comprised the majority of their voters . They 
were turned off by their representative, whom they correctly perceived to be too liberal 
(see Table 2, p. 344 of Overby and Brown 2002). Similarly, Petrocik and Desposato 
(1998) find an interesting curvilinear relationship with Democratic percent of the vote 
and change in the percent black in 1994 (see the figure displayed in Appendix B, p. 632) . 
It may have been the case that voters in the 1990s wanted a new direction in public policy 
and this was only possible by voting in a Republican majority. It appears to be a question 
of micro versus macro responsiveness. Members are responsive, but this may not be 
satisfactory when voters want a change in partisan representation . 
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ensuring v. providing an equal opportunity for minority descrip-
tive representation, and (2) descriptive v. substantive minority 
representation. A major point of contention is whether distri cts 
should be configured to guarantee election of minority candi-
dates or should contain just enough minorities to provide minor-
ity voters with an equal chance to elect their prefe rred 
candidates. Even if it was agreed that districts should be raci ally 
configured at the point of equal opportunity, it may be impracti-
cal to do so because the point of equal opportunity appears to be 
district specific and varies across space and time. 
The literature on redistricting and descriptive representati on 
does not provide firm estimates for a minimum threshold of mi-
nority population necessary to provide a fair chance for descrip-
tive representation. We cannot be sure that a non-incum bent 
black Democrat can win in a minority influence district in the 
South because this scenario has not materialized. We can be con-
fident, however, that in general a minority candidate has a better 
than even chance of winning election in districts that have less 
than majority-minority populations. But there is substantial vari-
ability in the minimum minority percentage necessary to give 
minority voters an equal opportunity to elect their candidat e of 
choice. The point of equal opportunity varies across space and 
time and it is dependent on the current configuration of distri cts. 
The point of equal opportunity was lower in the 1990s because 
redistricting plans established majority-minority and minority 
influence districts with substantial numbers of white voters par-
tial to the Democratic party (Canon 1999a). 
A reconfiguration of districts would invariably have an effect 
on the point of equal opportunity. One reason racial polariza tion 
is higher in majority white districts is because these districts 
were purposely drawn to concentrate the most Republican voters 
(e.g., southern white suburbanites). Nonetheless, since there is 
less racially polarized voting where blacks and whites live in 
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close proximity (the inner city), this geographic reality places a 
ceiling on the degree that redistricting accentuates differences in 
the voting behavior of whites versus minorities. Another compli-
cation that mainly affects the South is the presence of a continu-
ing realignment of whites into the GOP. The point of equal 
opportunity will continue to fluctuate considerably in the South 
because of its dynamic electoral environment. A substantial al-
teration in the racial, geographic, and partisan composition of 
congressional boundaries can significantly increase or decrease 
the point of equal opportunity for electing Black and Hispanic 
representatives." 
Despite the variability associated with the point of equal op-
portunity, from a policy standpoint, if the goal is to increase sub-
stantive minority representation then the minority percentage in 
many minority representatives' districts needs to be lowered. In 
those parts of the country (especially the South), where the 
tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representation is 
substantial, divvying up substantial shares of minority popula-
tions across several districts increases the overall influence of 
minority voters as reflected in the roll-call voting behavior of 
members and also increases the competitiveness of elections. As 
shown by Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran (1996), Epstein and 
O'Halloran (1999a; 1999b; 2000), and Lublin (1997b ), minority 
voters exert an influence on the roll-call behavior of members 
before they attain the critical mass needed to elect their own pre-
ferred candidates. 
The level of racially polarized voting determines the severity 
of the tradeoff between descriptive and substantive representa-
tion. The more the preferences of whites diverge from the prefer-
ences of minorities the more important it is for district minority 
11 It is of course also true that the characteristics of particular candidates can decrease or 
increase the point of equal opportunity for electing minority candidates . 
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populations to be large enough to impact electoral outcomes in a 
greater number of districts. In the South, racial redistricting 
negatively impacted the overall representation of minorities be-
cause it dismantled the biracial coalitions that assured the elec-
tion of a higher number of moderate white Democrats (Lublin 
and Voss 2003). Studies that assess the effect of redistricting on 
roll-call voting make it clear that who is elected matters much 
more than the effect of racial/partisan composition on a mem-
ber's voting behavior. In those studies (Bullock 1995c; Whitby 
1997) that account for partisan change by providing a dummy for 
a seat that changed partisan hands after redistricting, the differ-
ence in the roll-call voting behavior of a Republican who re-
places a Democrat is enormous. As Epstein and O'H alloran 
(2000, 105) put it, "electoral effects-who you elect-us ually 
dominate representation effects-how they vote." And, because 
of geographic and demographic constraints, there is an upper 
limit on the number of black majority districts that can be cre-
ated (Swain 1993). Thus, it is far more desirable to increase the 
chances of electing candidates who must pay attention to minor-
ity interests whether or not they happen to be Black. 
Despite evidence demonstrating a tradeoff between descrip-
tive and substantive minority representation, there is strong resis-
tance to reducing the populations in majority-minority districts. 
For one, many black and Hispanic representatives prefer to run 
in districts where their election is guaranteed. Also, some schol-
ars (see Canon 1999b; Guinier 1994) argue that there is a funda-
mental difference in the kind of representation that accrues from 
the particular race/ethnicity of the representative. And there is 
evidence that suggests highly educated blacks favor majority-
minority districts (fate 2003}-perhaps leading to elite-driven 
resistance to creating more minority influence districts at the ex-
pense of majority-minority districts. 
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party Competition 
There is also substantial disagreement as to the effect of re-
districting on party competition in the 1990s. Part of the reason 
for this is that so many studies employ different methods and 
conceptual approaches. Another complication arises from the 
level of analysis. A study that seeks to capture the aggregate ef-
fect of redistricting will miss effects noticeable at a lower level, 
especially in the case of studies that examine the partisan effect 
of redistricting in a single state. Even if it was possible to bring 
some standardization to the literature, there is an inherent com-
plication in this line of research. In the South, the focus of the 
bulk of the studies, most of the evidence points to an ongoing 
partisan realignment. A task in most of these studies has been to 
sort GOP gains according to evidence of realignment ( or normal 
two-party competition) from those gains attributable to redistrict-
ing. To some extent, it may not be possible to disentangle redis-
tricting effects from realigning effects because redistricting is 
such a pervasive intervening factor. fu this section I present three 
possible explanations for the high variance and mixed findings: 
(1) the timing and magnitude of effects, (2) differing levels of 
analysis, and (3) the difficulty of separating realigning effects 
from redistricting effects. 
As Petrocik and Desposato (1998) explain, the importance of 
the political behavior of new voters has been overlooked in most 
studies. Whereas the effect of race-based redistricting is more 
immediate with the change in the black composition of districts 
registering an effect on the two-party share of the House vote in 
1992, the impact of new voters persists at least through 1994. fu 
other words, the timing of the effects of redistricting may have 
worked in two overlapping stages. First, the large decline in 
black constituents leads directly to GOP wins in several districts 
(perhaps as many as six) in 1992. Many other Democratic-held 
districts are made competitive by the decline in black constitu-
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ents and the concomitant increase in new voters. Corresponding 
with a reduction in black voters, the second-order effect of new 
voters further serves to endanger many Democrats in 1992 and 
accounts for the actual defeat of several Democrats in 1994. 
Of course the second-order effect that Petrocik and Desposato 
place so much stock in would not be as strong without the im-
plementation of race-based redistricting. The reconfiguration of 
new voters is determined entirely by racial redistricting and thus 
it may not make much sense to emphasize the effect of new vot-
ers as though it is a separable phenomenon. As stated by Lublin 
and Voss (2000, 436), placing an emphasis on the second-order 
effect of new voters "strikes us as a matter of seman-
tics ... because it still means that Democratic incumbents suffered 
after white Republicans took the place of their minority voter 
base." 
As discussed, the timing of the impact of redistricting on 
party competition is an important consideration because the ef-
fects can persist over several elections. Also, the use of counter-
factual analyses can uncover the magnitude of the effects of 
redistricting on party competition. In addition to Hill (1995) and 
Hill and Rae (2000), both of whom use the Judgelt program to 
run counterfactual models, Swain, Borrelli, and Reed (1998) 
show how redistricting favored the GOP under the hypothetical 
condition of all open seats in 1992. 
Swain, Borrelli, and Reed seek to answer two questions: (1) 
did one party clearly benefit from the post-1990 redistricting? (2) 
did party control of redistricting at the state-level lead to partisan 
advantage? The authors estimate the partisan composition of 
every district for 1990 and 1992 to see if either party benefited. 
If incumbency is accounted for, it appears neither party was ad-
vantaged by the post-1990 redistricting. However, if projections 
assume every seat is open in 1992, then the Republican party 
clearly benefits, especially in the South where the GOP is pre-
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dieted to net 17 seats ( only 4 seats if incumbency is accounted 
for). Even though the first question is answered by finding the 
GOP benefited by the post-1990 redistricting under the condition 
of all open seats, there is no evidence that partisan gerrymander-
ing systematically favored either party at the state-level. Party 
control of redistricting at the state-level did not show any parti-
san impact in the aggregate (across states). The authors contend 
that if one only seeks to answer the short term question of how 
redistricting impacted partisan fortunes, incumbency should be 
accounted for and thus neither party was advantaged. But if one 
cares to consider the long term effects of redistricting, then the 
open seats assumption is more sensible and in this case, the Re-
publican party clearly benefited from the post-1990 redistricting. 
The use of counterfactuals points to a substantial redistrict-
ing-induced effect on party competition. Under the scenario out-
lined by Petrocik and Desposato (1998), the electoral earthquake 
of 1994 may not have been as strong if redistricting had not un-
hinged so many voters from the incumbents who represented 
them before reapportionment. Severing the bond of incumbency 
enhanced the likelihood that so many new constituents would 
now vote Republican in 1992 and especially in 1994 when na-
tional conditions swung heavily in favor of the GOP. Further-
more, Swain, Borrelli, and Reed (1998) present evidence that the 
short-term benefit of incumbency in 1992 was enough to prevent 
a potentially massive gain in seats. for Republicans in the South. 
It turns out that from 1994 to 2000, the number of Democrat-
held districts lost to Republicans in open seat contests was sev-
enteen (McKee 2002). Undoubtedly, redistricting made these 
seats more electorally advantageous to the Republican party. 
The level of analysis also accounts for so many mixed find-
ings with regard to the effect of redistricting on party competi-
tion. Studies that assess the aggregate effects of redistricting 
(national and regional) fail to detect the effects present at the 
VOL . 32 2004 
36 MCKEE 
subregional and state-level. Lublin (1997b, 113) criticizes Petro-
cik and Desposato on this point stating that "[t]heir focus on the 
aggregate shift in voting patterns ... prevents them from being 
able to answer the key question of whether a fraction of the seats 
won by Republicans could have been held by Democrats if racial 
redistricting had not occurred" (see also Lublin and Voss 2000, 
434-436). 
As mentioned, Swain, Borrelli, and Reed (1998) find that in 
the aggregate, party control of redistricting at the state-level did 
not amount to a partisan advantage. A similar study by Niemi 
and Abramowitz (1994) arrives at the same finding. A shortcom-
ing in both of these works is their focus on the immediate effect 
of partisan control of redistricting at the state-level by evaluating 
election data for just 1992. Once again, there is strong evidence 
that the effect of redistricting can persist over several elections. 
Furthermore, as Lublin (1997b) shows, although Florida and 
Georgia had Democratically controlled state legislatures, these 
states' redistricting plans favored the GOP. Dividing the South 
into Deep (AL, GA, LA, MS, and SC) and Peripheral (AR, FL, 
NC, TN, TX, and VA) subregions reveals a Republican redistrict-
ing advantage in the Deep South states and a Democratic redis-
tricting advantage in the Peripheral South states. 
In the Deep South, redistricting clearly favored the GOP (see 
McKee 2002). Republicans benefited the most from redistricting 
in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina; Louisiana was a De-
mocratic gerrymander (Lublin 1997b ); Mississippi's redistricting 
aided the GOP by increasing the black percentage in its one 
black majority district (2nd). In the peripheral South, with the 
exception of Florida, the Democratic party was in control of re-
districting. Arkansas and Tennessee did not create new black ma-
jority districts and their new congressional boundaries underwent 
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minor adjustrnents19; North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia how-
ever, implemented Democratic gerrymanders (Lublin 1997b ). 
State-level studies have served the important function of 
clarifying and dissecting the partisan effects of redistricting on 
party competition. It is no wonder that regional and national 
studies failed to find a partisan advantage because of redistrict-
ing, since in the aggregate, the presence of several states with 
either Democratic or Republican gerrymanders served to cancel 
out their partisan effects. 
State-level studies of congressional redistricting by Beachler 
(1998) (Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas), Gronke and Wilson 
(1999) (North Carolina), Kousser (1996) (California, North 
Carolina, and Texas), Lublin (1995; 1997b) (Alabama and North 
Carolina), Rush (2000) (Montana), Weber (2000) (Georgia, Lou-
isiana, North Carolina, and Texas), and Webster (1993) {Ala-
bama) have done much to further our understanding of the 
partisan effects of 1990s redistricting on party competition. 
In fact, there is state-level evidence that suggests the re-
quirement to create black majority districts eventually eroded 
Democratic fortunes even in a state like Texas, which engaged in 
some extremely creative cartography to implement a highly suc-
cessful Democratic gerrymander. States with the most Democ-
ratic redistricting plans (i.e., Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia) would almost certainly have produced even more 
favorable Democratic gerrymanders if they were not constrained 
by the majority-minority mandate (Shotts 2001). 
Finally, another reason there is such an utter lack of consen-
sus about the role of redistricting in affecting party competition 
is the difficulty of separating realignment effects from redistrict-
ing effects. These two types of effects are to some degree indi-
19 Arkansas is the only southern state without a majority-minority district and Arkansas 
and Tennessee are the only southern states not covered by the Voting Rights Act. 
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visible. Consider a simple example. A Democrat-held district in 
the South is trending Republican prior to redistricting as many of 
its residents are realigning in favor of the GOP. After redistrict-
ing, the district's new boundaries contain less minority voters, 
making it even more Republican. The Democratic incumbent 
faces a strong challenge from a Republican state legislator. The 
challenger wins with 55% of the vote and proceeds to win re-
election comfortably for as many terms as he/she wishes to 
serve. How much of the victory can be attributed to voter re-
alignment and how much to redistricting? This strategic politi-
cian may have won the seat prior to redistricting since a good 
share of Republican voters supported the Democratic incumbent 
because of the absence of a quality Republican challenger. But it 
took a favorable redistricting for the Republican state legislator 
to contest the seat. It is evident that both redistricting and re-
alignment factor into the Republican challenger's win, but it also 
appears exceedingly difficult to determine how much weight to 
assign to each effect. As Lublin and Voss (2000) point out: 
On balance, changes in party preferences caused by 
concentrating minorities will tend to alter a state's 
aggregate vote so we cannot separate this policy de-
cision from the southern Republican realignment to-
ward the GOP as though they were discrete events .... 
[P]artisan preferences are intimately tied to district-
ing policy, and they are not merely part of the back-
ground against which redistricting operates. (437, 
439-440) 
CONCLUSION 
More research needs to be undertaken to clarify the relation-
ship between redistricting and minority representation, party 
competition, and legislative responsiveness. Research on the ef-
fects of redistricting on minority representation and legislative 
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responsiveness is more clear-cut and yet it is also more politi-
cally controversial. We may have more confidence in the find-
ings from this literature, but the implications for policy remain 
firmly tied to normative positions. All things constant, a decline 
in the number of majority-minority districts will increase the 
likelihood that there will be a reduction in the total number of 
minority representatives. But incremental reductions could pos-
sibly increase the number of minority members because in poli-
tics ceteris paribus does not exist. We do know however, that 
significant reductions in minority populations will lead to greater 
substantive representation at the expense of descriptive represen-
tation because white Democrats dominate elections in minority-
influence districts. And in the South, given the current strength 
of the Republican party, it would probably take a drastic reduc-
tion and dispersal of the minority population for Democrats to 
have any hope of winning back a majority of seats. In this case, 
it probably makes more sense to maintain some minimum 
threshold for the number of districts that guarantee the election 
of minority representatives. 
The literature on the effect of redistricting on party competi-
tion remains open to vigorous debate primarily because it is so 
difficult to isolate the impact of redistricting on party competi-
tion. There appears to be significant insight to be gleaned from 
focusing on state-level analyses because aggregate analyses of-
ten fail to detect lower level effects. Then again, the researcher's 
question determines the approach to take. Aggregate analysis 
certainly serves a useful purpose if the goal is to assess the over-
all effect of redistricting. But many researchers make the mistake 
of claiming redistricting has no effect on party competition based 
on aggregate analyses. These claims are instances of the ecologi-
cal inference fallacy; at the state-level, there may be numerous 
cases of blatant and highly effective partisan gerrymanders. An-
other complication is that the effects of redistricting may persist 
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over several elections . Even a thorough reading of the literature 
on redistricting and party competition will puzzle the most gifted 
scholars. But as social scientists, we are in the business of solv-
ing puzzles and fortunately, the phenomenon of redistric ting 
should keep us employed for a long time to come. 
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